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6 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADPC

SUBJECT: FE Division Summary of Principal Factors Affecting Area Strategic Concepts for the Cold War

REFERENCE: T.S. 66360, Memorandum for All Division Chiefs, 20 Feb. 1952

I Problem:

To examine the area contribution to the formulation of a U.S. cold war global strategy.

II Assumption:

The Kremlin, without recourse to general war for the next five years, will carry out an unrelenting expansion of the cold war in an attempt to gain world-wide Communist domination.

III General Discussion:

1. The above assumption is of particular significance to the FE Division. For the past five years the cold war in the Far East has been, in reality, a hot war. On 19 December 1946, the Communist-led Viet Minh commenced hostilities with the French Union Forces in Indochina. On 26 June 1950, the North Korean Peoples Republic began its aggression against the Republic of Korea. And during this same period, the Peoples Liberation Army completed the Communist conquest of mainland China. Since the proclamation of the Peoples Republic in China, 1 October 1949, the Chinese Communists have carried out an aggressive internal campaign to solidify control and eliminate resistance elements; they have "volunteered" in support of the North Korean aggression; they have supplied the Viet Minh armies in Indochina with material and technical assistance; they have poised their troops on the borders of Indochina and Burma. In addition to this, Communist-led insurgent groups have been active in Malaya and the Philippines. Therefore, although it may be assumed that the Kremlin may refrain from general war, these facts show that during the next five years the Communist global strategy in the Far East is to continue to pursue the same militant expansionism which has been pursued for the past five years.


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3. Attached, in compliance with your request, is a first draft of this Division's comments on the topics outlined in reference paper. It is submitted that the time limit was insufficient for careful analysis and weighing of considerations. A re-draft is in the process of preparation.

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Chief, FE

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FE:LG:rw

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